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摘 要 
本论文研究公司财务困境如何影响中国上市公司外部非执行董事（NED）的
薪酬政策。同等薪酬水平下，处于财务困境中的公司常常会因为风险高而面
临非执行董事缺位的问题。因此，处理财务困境中的公司会通过提高薪酬水
平以吸引有能力的外部非执行董事，以帮助解决公司的财务困难。本文的研
究结果支持上述理论假设。本文还研究了 NED 年龄如何影响 NED 的薪酬水平。
结果显示，相对于非财务困境公司，处于财务困境中的公司提供更高的薪酬
以吸引年轻的非执行董事，而年长的非执行董事拿到的增量薪酬相对较少。
这些结果表明，解决财务困难，年轻 NED 的能力或许比年长 NED 的经验更重
要。最后本文分析了公司性质的影响。研究发现，面对可能的财务危机，国
有控股企业不会像民营企业那样通过提高薪酬水平来吸引外部执行董事以解
决公司的财务困难。总之，本文研究表明外部非执行董事对中国企业咨询角
色的重要性。  
关键词：非执行董事（NED); NED薪酬; 财务困境; 中国证据 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines how financial distress of a firm will impact the non-executive director (NED) 
compensation within Chinese listed firms. Firms facing financial distress will find it challenging 
to attract NED to their board of directors. Therefore, this study finds evidence that such firms 
facing financial distress will increase NED remuneration so as to attract NED. This study also 
investigates how NED compensation varies with NED age. The results indicate that older NED 
receive a rather reduced compensation as compared to their younger counterparts. This paper’s 
final investigation involves examing how state owned enterprises (SOE) facing financial distress 
compensate their NED. This research reveals that state owned enterprises do not necessarily face 
the same kind of pressure as private firms when it comes to attracting NED.  
The implications of this study reveals the growing importance of NED within Chinese firms and 
how NED can be incentivised to assist in reducing agency problems. The results attained from this 
research provide valuable guidance as to how firms in China can properly structure their 
compensation policies as to increase the monitoring and advising efficiency of their NED. Even 
though this research finds that SOE facing financial distress do not necessarily experience the need 
to attract NED, it provides enlightenment for SOE to develop corporate governance structures that 
will maximize shareholders wealth. 
Keywords: Non-executive directors (NED), NED compensation, Financial distress, China 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study examines the association between non-executive directors (NED) compensation and 
firms facing financial distress in China's publicly traded firms. Chang et al. (2015)  define a firm 
to be financially distressed when the firm is no longer able to meet its financial obligations and 
hence the firm is forced to undertake drastic actions to discharge its obligations. Under the agency 
framework, non-executive directors act as monitors, controllers and advisors of management on 
behalf of shareholders. They align the interests of management with that of the shareholders. 
This paper posists the following assumption about firms facing financial distress in China. Firms 
facing financial distress are most likley to increase NED compensation so as to attract NED to 
their board of directors. Kang and Mitnik (2014), state that financial distress results in substantial 
costs on firms and brings about all-around changes in corporate structure and decision making. 
One of the major changes brought about by financial distress includes changes to NED 
compensation. Compensation policy is regarded as an important aspect of a firms' strategy when 
dealing with financial distress, through provisions that change managers' incentives, Gilson and 
Vetsuypens (1993). In the event of financial distress, it is expected that NED will suffer losses 
both in  their compensation and personal reputation. NED are most likely to have their 
renumeration cut or defferred in the event of financial distress. Except for financial losses, an NED 
of a firm facing financial distress will most likely lose his or her managerial reputation which will 
result in a reduction of his or her future compensation or employability in a similar position. With 
this assumption that financial distress can cause considerable personal loss for NED, firms 
experiencing financial distress risk might have to offer higher levels of compensation to attract 
NED to their firms.  
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Next, this paper examines the relationship between NED compensation and NED age in firms 
facing financial distress. Consistent with a study done by Chang et al. (2015), this paper puts forth 
that the loss to be incurred by younger NED in terms of reputation and financial loss will be greater 
than older NED because they have more productive working years ahead of them which will be 
affected by them being on the board of directors in a financially distressed firm. In contrast to this, 
older NED will not suffer great losses for being an NED in a financially distressed firm as they 
have fewer working years left before their retirement. It can therefore be expected that the younger 
NED will require much more compensation compared to the older NED for sitting on the board of 
a financially distressed firm. 
This papers final research question involves investigating the relationship between state owned 
enterprises (SOE) facing financial distress and NED compensation. Different from non-SOEs 
which will be pressured to attract NED in the face of financial distress, it is expected that SOE will 
not encounter such pressure to find new NED. A possible explanation for this scenario is that SOE 
consider NED to be government employees therefore the SOE may not necessarily see the need to 
adjust NED compensation to attract NED to the firm. This paper therefore expects that in the event 
the SOE faces financial distress NED compensation will not be increased to attract NED to the 
firm. 
To test these research questions, this paper uses a sample consisting of 4932 firm observations 
from Chinese1 listed firms. The sample period ranges from 2001 to 2014. 
In line with the above mentioned research questions, this paper finds evidence of a positive and 
highly significant relationship between NED compensation and firms facing financial distress in 
Chinas’ listed firms. Consistent with this paper’s expectation, an increase in NED compensation 
is observed when the firms face financial distress. This research papers’ results also find a 
significant and negative association between NED compensation and NED age. These findings 
offer support to the prediction that a lower compensation package is given to older NED as 
compared to the compensation package given to younger NED. This result is also similar to that 
got by Chang et al. (2015). The results relating to NED compensation and SOE facing financial 
                                                          
1 This study investigates NED compensation and firms’ financial distress in China's domestically listed firms. This 
study excludes firms listed in Hong Kong. 
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distress indicate a significant and negative relationship. This confirms that during financial distress 
SOE do not increase NED compensation as witnessed in non-SOE firms. It can thus be concluded 
that SOE do not face pressure to attract NED to their boards. 
This paper makes a number of significant contributions to the already existing corporate 
governance literature both in China and worldwide. It fills a gap in the limited literature on NED 
compensation. Consistent with Chang et al. (2015), it also gives support to the relationship between 
NED compensation and NED age. It is also the first paper to examine the association between 
NED compensation and  a firm’s financial distress in Chinese listed firms. Finally, this paper 
provides valuable insight for developing economies on how firms facing financial distress address 
the issue of compensating their NED. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section, chapter two, consists of the 
literature review which describes financial distress and NED compensation within China. This is 
followed by the hypotheses development. Chapter three details a description of the sample and 
data source. It also includes the variable descriptions and descriptive statisitics. Chapter four 
highlights the methodology used and the results of the regression analysis. Robustness tests are 
also included. Chapter five discusses the conclusion.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature review 
There is limited literature that explores non-executive directors (NED) compensation. With most 
literature focusing on CEO compensation, there is an apparent gap within the corporate governance 
literature with regards to NED compensation. NED play a vital role in reducing agency costs 
through the advising and monitoring of the firm’s senior management, thereby aligning 
shareholder interests with that of senior management. 
The available literature on NED compensation that focuses on firm characteristics, and has found 
a positive relationship between non-executive director remuneration and firm size (Adams and 
Ferreira (2008), Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006), Hempel and Fay (1994)). The literature also 
finds that NED compensation is positively associated with growth and investment opportunities 
Linn and Park (2005). There is also evidence of a positive relationship between executive pay and 
non-executive director remuneration (Boyd (1994), Brick et al. (2006)). Available theory and 
previous findings also suggest that many executives seek non-executive director positions for non-
pecuniary reasons Fama and Jensen (1983), but do not assess what such non-pecuniary rewards 
may cost investors. However, none of the existing literature has examined the effects of financial 
distress on NED compensation. This paper will therefore be the first to examine this relationship 
and it will solely focus on Chinese listed firms as these firms represent a unique sample. 
2.1.1 Financial distress 
Chang et al (2015)  define a firm to be financially distressed when the firm is no longer able to 
meet its financial obligations and hence the firm is forced to undertake drastic actions to discharge 
its obligations, such as file for bankruptcy, undergo a troubled debt restructuring, sell assets at 
“fire-sale” prices, or be acquired by a financially stronger firm.   
According to Kang and Mitnik (2014), financial distress incites substantial costs on firms and 
brings about all-around changes in corporate structure and decision making. A subset of the 
changes brought about by financial distress includes changes to NED compensation. 
Compensation policy is regarded as an important aspect of a firms' strategy when dealing with 
financial distress, through provisions that change managers' incentives Gilson and Vetsuypens 
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(1993). In developed economies the financial distress of a firm is widely accepted as an important 
aspect for disciplining the behavior of top management in distressed firms Fan et al. (2013). 
An examination of literature closely related to a firm’s financial distress and the resulting NED 
compensation, by Kaplan and Reishus (1990) finds that executives at troubled firms were less 
likely to obtain incremental non-executive director appointments but the same executives were 
much less likely to leave their non-executive director positions.  
2.1.2 Board of directors in China 
Chinese publicly traded companies have a two-tier board which includes a main board of directors 
and a supervisory board of directors. These firms are required to have a minimum of 5 directors 
and a maximum of 19 directors. In line with Chinese regulations2 as to the duties of the board of 
directors, Chen (2015) lists a number of responsibilities to be carried out by the board of directors. 
These duties include but are not limited to following: convening and carrying out the resolutions 
made at the shareholders' meetings; determining the operation plans and investment plans; working 
out the company's annual financial budget plans and final account plans; working out the 
company's plans on merger, division, change of the company type, dissolution; making decisions 
on hiring or dismissing the company's manager and his remuneration, etc. 
Chen (2015) further notes that majority of the NED on  the board of directors in Chinese firms are 
usually retired government officials and experienced executives from other companies. This trend 
is similar to that of developed of countries where the experience of managers from other companies 
and the political connections of former government servants are regarded as essential and 
advantageous to the firm having such NED on their boards of directors.  
2.1.3 Non-executive directors in China 
In theory, Coles et al. (2008) state that the main duty of NED3 is to monitor senior management 
and also to act as advisors to the CEO. Before 2002 Chinese listed firms were not required by law 
to have NED on their board of directors. Allen et al. (2005) and Jingu (2007) detail how since the 
early 2000s China's public firms were under pressure from investors to reform. Conyon and He 
(2011) state that as result of the ongoing pressure, Chinese listed firms have began to adopt 
                                                          
2 Listed firms with a board have the major decisions made by the board and ratified by the shareholders. 
3 The corporate governance code defines director independence as: “The independent director shall be independent 
from the listed company that employs them and the company's major shareholders. An independent director cannot 
(i) be related to the manager, (ii) be one of the top 10 shareholders or hold more than 1% of the company shares, or 
(iii) have a business relationship with the firm Jiang and Kim (2015). 
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Western corporate governance models, with particular reforms focusing on the board of directors. 
An example of this is the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC, 2002a). One of the important features of this code requires listed firms to 
include independent directors to their board of directors. The regulations therefore state that at 
least one-third of the board of directors should consist of NED. As  is consistent with corporate 
governance literature, the addition of NED to the board will increase monitoring of managers 
therefore reducing the agency costs and aligning shareholders interests with that of the managers. 
It is therefore expected that a firm will therefore increase the number of NED if the marginal 
benefit from monitoring and advising exceeds the marginal cost resulting from information 
acquisition and communication. However, according to Jiang et al. (2015), in the case with 
Chinese firms, most firms will only maintain the minimum number of NED as required by 
regulation. Irrespective of this we expect to witness a significant change in NED4 compensation if 
the firm faces financial distress. 
2.1.4 Non-executive directors compensation in China  
In the years preceeding 2001, Chinese listed firms were not required to disclose executive 
compensation information, though some firms voluntarily reported their executive renumeration 
figures. In 2001 the Chinese Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) stipulated that all listed 
firms disclose the sum of total compensation for the three highest-paid management and the three 
highest paid board members. This regulation was ammended in 2006 and the CSRC expects all 
listed firms to  disclose the renumeration received by each individual board member and senior 
management. The CSRC also prohibits the use of stock options 5 as a form of payment to 
independent directors. This paper uses a sample of listed firms starting from the year 2001 when 
data on NED compensation and executive compensation became publicly available. It can also be 
concluded that NED compensation is in the form of salary and bonuses. So for the puposes of this 
research, the total renumeration figure per firm of all NED in the firm will be the sum of salary 
and bonuses received. 
                                                          
4 The proportion of independent directors on the board is about one-third, so the non-independent State influenced 
directors can still have significant power and influence Conyon and He (2011) 
5 CSRC regulations, 2005a 
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2.1.5 Age and Distress 
Prior studies on CEO cash compensation have found a significant positive relationship between 
CEO cash compensation and CEO age (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). They find evidence of CEO 
cash compensation increasing as the CEO approaches 59 years of age after which the compensation 
begins to steadily reduce. This study expects a smilar relationship between NED compensation 
and NED age. However, for firms facing financial distress, this paper expects that older NED will 
receive a lower compensation premium as compared to the younger NED. Following a study done 
by Chang et al. (2015), this paper posits that the loss to be incurred by younger NED will be greater 
because they have more productive working years ahead of them which will be affected by loss of 
reputation due to being on the board of directors in a financially distressed firm. On the other hand, 
older NED will not be greatly affected by losses for being an NED in a financially distressed firm 
as they have fewer years remaining before their retirement. It can therefore be expected that the 
younger NED will require much more compensation compared to the older NED for sitting on the 
board of a financially distressed firm.   
2.2 Hypothesis formulation 
It is frequently argued that independent outside directors have more incentives to effectively 
monitor the CEO because they are less subject to CEO influence and have reputations to protect 
in the labor market (Fama and Jensen (1983) and Weisbach (1988)). 
In the event of financial distress, it is expected that NED will suffer losses both in  their 
compensation and personal reputation. NED are most likely to have their renumeration cut or 
defferred in the event of financial distress. Furthermore, apart from financial losses, an NED of a 
firm facing financial distress will lose his/her managerial reputation which will result in a reduction 
of his/her future compensation or employability in the position of non-executive director. This 
argument is further supported by Berk et al. (2010), and their findings reveal that financially 
distressed firms pay higher levels to their workers to compensate for losses that are associated with 
a firm facing financial distress. NED will therefore require a higher compensation package to sit 
on the board of fianaciallly distressed firm. With the view that financial distress can cause 
considerable personal loss for NED, firms experiencing financial distress risk might have to offer 
higher levels of compensation to attract NED to their firms.  
In summary NED in finacially distressed firms are likely to suffer losses in terms of their 
compensation and reputation (that is, their future employment and compensation opportunities will 
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